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Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms
Shao-Heng Ko; Kamesh Munagala -
Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic Candidates
Vitalii Emelianov; Nicolas Gast; Patrick Loiseau -
Lotteries for Shared Experiences
Carlos Bonet; Nick Arnosti -
Markov Persuasion Processes and Reinforcement Learning
Jibang Wu; Zixuan Zhang; Zhe Feng; Zhaoran Wang; Zhuoran Yang; Michael Jordan; Haifeng Xu -
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
Dirk Bergemann; Yang Cai; Grigoris Velegkas; Mingfei Zhao -
When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?
Will Ma -
Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing
Nikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach -
On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Integration
Rediet Abebe; Nicole Immorlica; Jon Kleinberg; Brendan Lucier; Ali Shirali -
Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions
Nir Bachrach; Inbal Talgam-Cohen -
Fair Allocations for Smoothed Utilities
Yushi Bai; Uriel Feige; Paul Gölz; Ariel Procaccia -
On Two-sided Matching in Infinite Markets
Yunseo Choi -
Randomized FIFO Mechanisms
Francisco Castro; Hongyao Ma; Hamid Nazerzadeh; Chiwei Yan -
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
Michal Feldman; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Nick Gravin; Daniel Schoepflin -
Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process
Thayer Morrill; Peter Troyan -
Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism
Wanchang Zhang -
In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins
Paul Gölz; Dominik Peters; Ariel Procaccia -
Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous Prices
Peng Shi -
Pair-efficient Reallocation of Indivisible Objects
Ozgun Ekici -
Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
Rachitesh Kumar; Christian Kroer; Santiago Balseiro -
Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints
Hanrui Zhang; Yu Cheng; Vincent Conitzer -
Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris; Alex Evans; Tarun Chitra; Stephen Boyd -
Bidders’ Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising Auctions
Shumpei Goke; Gabriel Y. Weintraub; Ralph Mastromonaco; Sam Seljan -
Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design
Martino Banchio; Andrzej Skrzypacz -
Improving Ranking Quality and Fairness in Swiss-System Chess Tournaments
Pascal Führlich; Ágnes Cseh; Pascal Lenzner; Agnes Cseh -
Screening p-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait
Federico Echenique; Kevin He -
Blockchain Stretching & Squeezing: Manipulating Time For Your Best Interest
Aviv Yaish; Saar Tochner; Aviv Zohar -
Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local Mechanisms
Alireza Fallah; Ali Makhdoumi; azarakhsh malekian; Asuman Ozdaglar -
Granular DeGroot Dynamics — a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks
Gideon Amir; Itai Arieli; Galit Ashkenazi-Golan; Ron Peretz -
Double Auctions and Transaction Costs
Simon Jantschgi; Heinrich H. Nax; Bary S.R. Pradelski; Marek Pycia -
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes
Emily Dale; Jessica Fielding; Hari Ramakrishnan; Sacheth Sathyanarayanan; S. Matthew Weinberg -
Credible Persuasion
Xiao Lin; Ce Liu -
Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules
Maneesha Papireddygari; Bo Waggoner -
Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives
Moshe Babaioff; Uriel Feige -
A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Non-Additive Values
Soheil Ghili -
Herd Design
Itai Arieli; Ronen Gradwohl; Rann Smorodinsky -
The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game
Akash Gaonkar; Divya Raghunathan; S. Matthew Weinberg -
Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem
Nick Arnosti; Will Ma -
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions
Vasilis Gkatzelis; Kostas Kollias; Alkmini Sgouritsa; Xizhi Tan -
Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information
Yingkai Li -
An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization
Mohammad Akbarpour; Eric Budish; Piotr Dworczak; Scott Kominers -
The Effect of Short-Term Rentals on Residential Investment
Ron Bekkerman; Maxime Cohen; Edward Kung; John Maiden; Davide Proserpio -
Delegated Pandora’s Box
Curtis Bechtel; Shaddin Dughmi; Neel Patel -
Monotone Additive Statistics
Xiaosheng Mu; Luciano Pomatto; Philipp Strack; Omer Tamuz -
On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms
Biaoshuai Tao -
Optimization of Scoring Rules
Yingkai Li; Jason D. Hartline; Liren Shan; Yifan Wu -
Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks
J. Massey Cashore; Peter Frazier; Eva Tardos -
Bias-Variance Games
Yiding Feng; Ronen Gradwohl; Jason Hartline; Aleck Johnsen; Denis Nekipelov; Jason D. Hartline -
Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping
Santiago R. Balseiro; Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab Mirrokni; Song Zuo -
Near-Optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources
Yiding Feng; Rad Niazadeh; Amin Saberi -
Optimized Fairness and Distortion in Voting
Soroush Ebadian; Anson Kahng; Dominik Peters; Nisarg Shah -
The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design
Reza Alijani; Siddhartha Banerjee; Kamesh Munagala; Kangning Wang -
Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and Applications
Evan Friedman; Felix Mauersberger -
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable
S. Matthew Weinberg; Zixin Zhou -
Max-Weight Online Stochastic Matching: \\ Improved Approximations Against the Online Benchmark
Mark Braverman; Mahsa Derakhshan; Antonio Molina Lovett -
Closure operators: Complexity and applications to classification and decision-making
Hamed Hamze Bajgiran; Federico Echenique -
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information
S. Nageeb Ali; Navin Kartik; Andreas Kleiner -
Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks
Yotam Gafni; Moshe Tennenholtz -
Robust Data-Driven Decisions Under Model Uncertainty
Xiaoyu Cheng -
The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization
Jon Kleinberg; Sendhil Mullainathan; Manish Raghavan -
Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret
Yiding Feng; Wei Tang; Haifeng Xu -
Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public Cloud
Patrick Hummel; Michael Schwarz -
A System-Level Analysis of Conference Peer Review
Yichi Zhang; Fang-Yi Yu; Grant Schoenebeck; David Kempe -
Private Private Information
Kevin He; Fedor Sandomirskiy; Omer Tamuz -
The production and consumption of social media
Apostolos Filippas; John Horton; Elliot Lipnowski -
Contracting and Vertical Control by a Dominant Platform
Zi Yang Kang; Ellen Muir -
Chasing Stars: Firms’ Strategic Responses to Online Consumer Ratings
Megan Hunter -
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
Jerry Anunrojwong; Santiago Balseiro; Omar Besbes; Santiago R. Balseiro -
The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets
Yeganeh Alimohammadi; Amin Saberi; Mohammad Akbarpour; Shengwu Li -
A Continuum Model of Stable Matching With Finite Capacities
Nick Arnosti -
Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design? Theory and Evidence
Natalie Cox; Ricardo Fonseca; Bobak Pakzad-Hurson -
Algorithmic Pricing Facilitates Tacit Collusion: Evidence fromE-Commerce
Leon Musolff -
Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: the Design of Multi-member Districts
Nikhil Garg; Wes Gurnee; David Rothschild; David Shmoys -
Statistical Discrimination in Stable Matchings
Rémi Castera; Patrick Loiseau; Bary S.R. Pradelski -
Price Interpretability of Prediction Markets: A Convergence Analysis
Dian Yu; Jianjun Gao; Weiping Wu; Zizhuo Wang -
Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents
Nika Haghtalab; Thodoris Lykouris; Sloan Nietert; Alexander Wei -
Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design
Afshin Nikzad -
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
Priyank Agrawal; Eric Balkanski; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Tingting Ou; Xizhi Tan -
The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence
Péter Biro; Avinatan Hassidim; Assaf Romm; Ran Shorrer; Sandor Sovago -
Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria
Ioannis Anagnostides; Gabriele Farina; Christian Kroer; Andrea Celli; Tuomas Sandholm -
Robust Bounds for Welfare Analysis
Zi Yang Kang; Shoshana Vasserman -
Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibilities and Limits in Singleton Congestion
Chenghan Zhou; Thanh H. Nguyen; Haifeng Xu -
On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching
Süleyman Kerimov; Itai Ashlagi; Itai Gurvich -
Periodic Reranking for Online Matching of Reusable Resources
Rajan Udwani -
General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching
Tomer Ezra; Michal Feldman; Nick Gravin; Zhihao Gavin Tang -
Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms
Estelle Varloot; Rida Laraki -
A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions
Antonin Macé; Rafael Treibich -
The Stationary Prophet Inequality Problem
Kristen Kessel; Ali Shameli; Amin Saberi; David Wajc -
Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price Rules
Miguel Alcobendas; Robert Zeithammer -
An algorithmic solution to the Blotto game using multi-marginal couplings
Vianney Perchet; Philippe Rigollet; Thibaut Le Gouic -
Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained Buyers
Eleni Batziou; Martin Bichler; Maximilian Fichtl -
A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
Niccolò Lomys; Takuro Yamashita -
Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks
Yukun Cheng; Xiaotie Deng; Yuhao Li; Xiang Yan -
How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India
Orhan Aygun; Bertan Turhan -
Peer Effects from Friends and Strangers: Evidence from Random Matchmaking in an Online Game
Daniel Goetz; Wei Lu -
Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
Javier Cembrano; Felix Fischer; David Hannon; Max Klimm -
Information Design in Concave Games
Alex Smolin; Takuro Yamashita -
Improved Online Contention Resolution for Matchings and Applications to the Gig Economy
Tristan Pollner; Mohammad Roghani; Amin Saberi; David Wajc -
The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing
Johannes Brustle; José Correa; Paul Dütting; Victor Verdugo -
Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards
Chang Liu -
Information Design for Differential Privacy
Ian M. Schmutte; Nathan Yoder -
Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury; Jugal Garg; Peter McGlaughlin; Ruta Mehta -
Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus Accuracy
Annie Liang; Jay Lu; Xiaosheng Mu -
Crowdsourcing and optimal market design
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson -
Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without Convexity
Paul Milgrom; Mitchell Watt -
Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks
Wanying Huang; Philipp Strack; Omer Tamuz -
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
Deniz Kattwinkel; Axel Niemeyer; Justus Preusser; Alexander Winter -
Quantal Correlated Equilibrium in Normal Form Games
Jakub Cerny; Bo An; Allan N. Zhang -
Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality
Saeed Alaei; Ali Makhdoumi; azarakhsh malekian; Rad Niazadeh -
Public Signals in Network Congestion Games
Martin Hoefer; Tim Koglin; Max Klimm; Svenja Marie Griesbach -
The Science of the Deal: Optimal Bargaining on eBay Using Deep Reinforcement Learning
Etan Green; Barry Plunkett -
Thompson Sampling with Unrestricted Delays
Han Wu; Stefan Wager -
Design and analysis of bipartite experiments under a linear exposure-response model
Christopher Harshaw; Fredrik Sävje; David Eisenstat; Vahab Mirrokni; Jean Pouget-Abadie -
Seeding a Simple Contagion
Evan Sadler -
Matchmaking Strategies for Maximizing Player Engagement in Video Games
Mingliu Chen; Adam N. Elmachtoub; Xiao Lei -
Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems
Kun Jin; Xueru Zhang; Mohammad Mahdi Khalili; Parinaz Naghizadeh; Mingyan Liu -
Dynamic Spatial Matching
Yash Kanoria -
Crowd Prediction Systems: Markets, Polls, and Elite Forecasters
Pavel Atanasov; Jens Witkowski; Barbara Mellers; Philip Tetlock -
Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multi-Channel Traffic
Vahideh Manshadi; Scott Rodilitz; Daniela Saban; Akshaya Suresh -
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals
Eric Neyman; Tim Roughgarden -
Persuasion as Transportation
Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy -
Causal Gradient Boosting: Boosted Instrumental Variable Regression
Edvard Bakhitov; Amandeep Singh -
Improved Upper Bounds for Finding Tarski Fixed Points
Xi Chen; Yuhao Li -
Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset
Modibo Camara -
Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization
Matteo Castiglioni; Alberto Marchesi; Nicola Gatti -
Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District
Maxwell Allman; Itai Ashlagi; Irene Lo; Juliette Love; Katherine Mentzer; Henry O’Connell; Lulabel Ruiz-Setz -
A Population’s Feasible Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko -
Costly Multidimensional Screening
Frank Yang -
Embeddings and Distance-based Demand for Differentiated Products
Lorenzo Magnolfi; Jonathon McClure; Alan Sorensen -
The Multisecretary Problem with Many Types
Omar Besbes; Yash Kanoria; Akshit Kumar -
A Dynamic Framework of School Choice: Effects of Middle Schools on High School Choice
Dong Woo Hahm; Minseon Park -
Contextually Private Mechanisms
Andreas Haupt; Zoe Hitzig -
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design
Yang Cai; Constantinos Daskalakis -
Equity in resident crowdsourcing: measuring under-reporting without ground truth data
Zhi Liu; Nikhil Garg -
Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints
Ethan Che -
Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources
Steven Delong; Alireza Farhadi; Rad Niazadeh; Balasubramanian Sivan -
Outcome-Driven Dynamic Refugee Assignment with Allocation Balancing
Kirk Bansak; Elisabeth Paulson -
Unpacking the Black Box: Regulating Algorithmic Decisions
Laura Blattner; Scott Nelson; Jann Spiess -
Optimal Credit Scores Under Adverse Selection
Andre Medeiros Sztutman; Nicole Immorlica; Robert Townsend -
Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single Controller
Muhammed Sayin; Kaiqing Zhang; Asuman Ozdaglar -
Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of Products
Arash Asadpour; Rad Niazadeh; Amin Saberi; Ali Shameli -
Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations
Sarah Dean; Jamie Morgenstern -
Speculation in Procurement Auctions
Shanglyu Deng -
Just Resource Allocation? How Algorithmic Predictions and Human Notions of Justice Interact
Amanda Kube; Sanmay Das; Patrick J. Fowler; Yevgeniy Vorobeychik -
Auction Throttling and Causal Inference of Online Advertising Effects
George Gui; Harikesh Nair; Fengshi Niu -
Estimation of Standard Auction Models
Yeshwanth Cherapanamjeri; Constantinos Daskalakis; Andrew Ilyas; Manolis Zampetakis -
Computationally Tractable Choice
Modibo Camara -
Optimal Stratetic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira; Sally Hahn; Catherine Yu; S. Matthew Weinberg -
Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation
Brian Zhang; Gabriele Farina; Andrea Celli; Tuomas Sandholm -
Asymmetric Taxation, Pass-through and Market Competition: Evidence from Ride-sharing and Taxis
Mario Leccese -
Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalities
Makis Arsenis; Robert Kleinberg
