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  • Home
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  • Program
    • Main Program
    • Tutorials
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    • Preview Day
    • Workshops
    • Mentoring Workshop
    • Accepted Papers
    • Awards
  • Participation
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Program

Accepted Papers

  • Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms
    Shao-Heng Ko; Kamesh Munagala
  • Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic Candidates
    Vitalii Emelianov; Nicolas Gast; Patrick Loiseau
  • Lotteries for Shared Experiences
    Carlos Bonet; Nick Arnosti
  • Markov Persuasion Processes and Reinforcement Learning
    Jibang Wu; Zixuan Zhang; Zhe Feng; Zhaoran Wang; Zhuoran Yang; Michael Jordan; Haifeng Xu
  • Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
    Dirk Bergemann; Yang Cai; Grigoris Velegkas; Mingfei Zhao
  • When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?
    Will Ma
  • Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing
    Nikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach
  • On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Integration
    Rediet Abebe; Nicole Immorlica; Jon Kleinberg; Brendan Lucier; Ali Shirali
  • Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions
    Nir Bachrach; Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • Fair Allocations for Smoothed Utilities
    Yushi Bai; Uriel Feige; Paul Gölz; Ariel Procaccia
  • On Two-sided Matching in Infinite Markets
    Yunseo Choi
  • Randomized FIFO Mechanisms
    Francisco Castro; Hongyao Ma; Hamid Nazerzadeh; Chiwei Yan
  • Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
    Michal Feldman; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Nick Gravin; Daniel Schoepflin
  • Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process
    Thayer Morrill; Peter Troyan
  • Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism
    Wanchang Zhang
  • In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins
    Paul Gölz; Dominik Peters; Ariel Procaccia
  • Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous Prices
    Peng Shi
  • Pair-efficient Reallocation of Indivisible Objects
    Ozgun Ekici
  • Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
    Rachitesh Kumar; Christian Kroer; Santiago Balseiro
  • Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints
    Hanrui Zhang; Yu Cheng; Vincent Conitzer
  • Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers
    Guillermo Angeris; Alex Evans; Tarun Chitra; Stephen Boyd
  • Bidders’ Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising Auctions
    Shumpei Goke; Gabriel Y. Weintraub; Ralph Mastromonaco; Sam Seljan
  • Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design
    Martino Banchio; Andrzej Skrzypacz
  • Improving Ranking Quality and Fairness in Swiss-System Chess Tournaments
    Pascal Führlich; Ágnes Cseh; Pascal Lenzner; Agnes Cseh
  • Screening p-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait
    Federico Echenique; Kevin He
  • Blockchain Stretching & Squeezing: Manipulating Time For Your Best Interest
    Aviv Yaish; Saar Tochner; Aviv Zohar
  • Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local Mechanisms
    Alireza Fallah; Ali Makhdoumi; azarakhsh malekian; Asuman Ozdaglar
  • Granular DeGroot Dynamics — a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks
    Gideon Amir; Itai Arieli; Galit Ashkenazi-Golan; Ron Peretz
  • Double Auctions and Transaction Costs
    Simon Jantschgi; Heinrich H. Nax; Bary S.R. Pradelski; Marek Pycia
  • Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes
    Emily Dale; Jessica Fielding; Hari Ramakrishnan; Sacheth Sathyanarayanan; S. Matthew Weinberg
  • Credible Persuasion
    Xiao Lin; Ce Liu
  • Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules
    Maneesha Papireddygari; Bo Waggoner
  • Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives
    Moshe Babaioff; Uriel Feige
  • A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Non-Additive Values
    Soheil Ghili
  • Herd Design
    Itai Arieli; Ronen Gradwohl; Rann Smorodinsky
  • The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game
    Akash Gaonkar; Divya Raghunathan; S. Matthew Weinberg
  • Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem
    Nick Arnosti; Will Ma
  • Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions
    Vasilis Gkatzelis; Kostas Kollias; Alkmini Sgouritsa; Xizhi Tan
  • Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information
    Yingkai Li
  • An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization
    Mohammad Akbarpour; Eric Budish; Piotr Dworczak; Scott Kominers
  • The Effect of Short-Term Rentals on Residential Investment
    Ron Bekkerman; Maxime Cohen; Edward Kung; John Maiden; Davide Proserpio
  • Delegated Pandora’s Box
    Curtis Bechtel; Shaddin Dughmi; Neel Patel
  • Monotone Additive Statistics
    Xiaosheng Mu; Luciano Pomatto; Philipp Strack; Omer Tamuz
  • On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms
    Biaoshuai Tao
  • Optimization of Scoring Rules
    Yingkai Li; Jason D. Hartline; Liren Shan; Yifan Wu
  • Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks
    J. Massey Cashore; Peter Frazier; Eva Tardos
  • Bias-Variance Games
    Yiding Feng; Ronen Gradwohl; Jason Hartline; Aleck Johnsen; Denis Nekipelov; Jason D. Hartline
  • Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping
    Santiago R. Balseiro; Yuan Deng; Jieming Mao; Vahab Mirrokni; Song Zuo
  • Near-Optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources
    Yiding Feng; Rad Niazadeh; Amin Saberi
  • Optimized Fairness and Distortion in Voting
    Soroush Ebadian; Anson Kahng; Dominik Peters; Nisarg Shah
  • The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design
    Reza Alijani; Siddhartha Banerjee; Kamesh Munagala; Kangning Wang
  • Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and Applications
    Evan Friedman; Felix Mauersberger
  • Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable
    S. Matthew Weinberg; Zixin Zhou
  • Max-Weight Online Stochastic Matching: \\ Improved Approximations Against the Online Benchmark
    Mark Braverman; Mahsa Derakhshan; Antonio Molina Lovett
  • Closure operators: Complexity and applications to classification and decision-making
    Hamed Hamze Bajgiran; Federico Echenique
  • Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information
    S. Nageeb Ali; Navin Kartik; Andreas Kleiner
  • Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks
    Yotam Gafni; Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Robust Data-Driven Decisions Under Model Uncertainty
    Xiaoyu Cheng
  • The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization
    Jon Kleinberg; Sendhil Mullainathan; Manish Raghavan
  • Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret
    Yiding Feng; Wei Tang; Haifeng Xu
  • Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public Cloud
    Patrick Hummel; Michael Schwarz
  • A System-Level Analysis of Conference Peer Review
    Yichi Zhang; Fang-Yi Yu; Grant Schoenebeck; David Kempe
  • Private Private Information
    Kevin He; Fedor Sandomirskiy; Omer Tamuz
  • The production and consumption of social media
    Apostolos Filippas; John Horton; Elliot Lipnowski
  • Contracting and Vertical Control by a Dominant Platform
    Zi Yang Kang; Ellen Muir
  • Chasing Stars: Firms’ Strategic Responses to Online Consumer Ratings
    Megan Hunter
  • On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
    Jerry Anunrojwong; Santiago Balseiro; Omar Besbes; Santiago R. Balseiro
  • The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets
    Yeganeh Alimohammadi; Amin Saberi; Mohammad Akbarpour; Shengwu Li
  • A Continuum Model of Stable Matching With Finite Capacities
    Nick Arnosti
  • Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design? Theory and Evidence
    Natalie Cox; Ricardo Fonseca; Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
  • Algorithmic Pricing Facilitates Tacit Collusion: Evidence fromE-Commerce
    Leon Musolff
  • Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: the Design of Multi-member Districts
    Nikhil Garg; Wes Gurnee; David Rothschild; David Shmoys
  • Statistical Discrimination in Stable Matchings
    Rémi Castera; Patrick Loiseau; Bary S.R. Pradelski
  • Price Interpretability of Prediction Markets: A Convergence Analysis
    Dian Yu; Jianjun Gao; Weiping Wu; Zizhuo Wang
  • Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents
    Nika Haghtalab; Thodoris Lykouris; Sloan Nietert; Alexander Wei
  • Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design
    Afshin Nikzad
  • Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
    Priyank Agrawal; Eric Balkanski; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Tingting Ou; Xizhi Tan
  • The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence
    Péter Biro; Avinatan Hassidim; Assaf Romm; Ran Shorrer; Sandor Sovago
  • Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria
    Ioannis Anagnostides; Gabriele Farina; Christian Kroer; Andrea Celli; Tuomas Sandholm
  • Robust Bounds for Welfare Analysis
    Zi Yang Kang; Shoshana Vasserman
  • Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibilities and Limits in Singleton Congestion
    Chenghan Zhou; Thanh H. Nguyen; Haifeng Xu
  • On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching
    Süleyman Kerimov; Itai Ashlagi; Itai Gurvich
  • Periodic Reranking for Online Matching of Reusable Resources
    Rajan Udwani
  • General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching
    Tomer Ezra; Michal Feldman; Nick Gravin; Zhihao Gavin Tang
  • Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms
    Estelle Varloot; Rida Laraki
  • A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions
    Antonin Macé; Rafael Treibich
  • The Stationary Prophet Inequality Problem
    Kristen Kessel; Ali Shameli; Amin Saberi; David Wajc
  • Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price Rules
    Miguel Alcobendas; Robert Zeithammer
  • An algorithmic solution to the Blotto game using multi-marginal couplings
    Vianney Perchet; Philippe Rigollet; Thibaut Le Gouic
  • Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained Buyers
    Eleni Batziou; Martin Bichler; Maximilian Fichtl
  • A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
    Niccolò Lomys; Takuro Yamashita
  • Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks
    Yukun Cheng; Xiaotie Deng; Yuhao Li; Xiang Yan
  • How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India
    Orhan Aygun; Bertan Turhan
  • Peer Effects from Friends and Strangers: Evidence from Random Matchmaking in an Online Game
    Daniel Goetz; Wei Lu
  • Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
    Javier Cembrano; Felix Fischer; David Hannon; Max Klimm
  • Information Design in Concave Games
    Alex Smolin; Takuro Yamashita
  • Improved Online Contention Resolution for Matchings and Applications to the Gig Economy
    Tristan Pollner; Mohammad Roghani; Amin Saberi; David Wajc
  • The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing
    Johannes Brustle; José Correa; Paul Dütting; Victor Verdugo
  • Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards
    Chang Liu
  • Information Design for Differential Privacy
    Ian M. Schmutte; Nathan Yoder
  • Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness
    Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury; Jugal Garg; Peter McGlaughlin; Ruta Mehta
  • Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus Accuracy
    Annie Liang; Jay Lu; Xiaosheng Mu
  • Crowdsourcing and optimal market design
    Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
  • Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without Convexity
    Paul Milgrom; Mitchell Watt
  • Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks
    Wanying Huang; Philipp Strack; Omer Tamuz
  • Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
    Deniz Kattwinkel; Axel Niemeyer; Justus Preusser; Alexander Winter
  • Quantal Correlated Equilibrium in Normal Form Games
    Jakub Cerny; Bo An; Allan N. Zhang
  • Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality
    Saeed Alaei; Ali Makhdoumi; azarakhsh malekian; Rad Niazadeh
  • Public Signals in Network Congestion Games
    Martin Hoefer; Tim Koglin; Max Klimm; Svenja Marie Griesbach
  • The Science of the Deal: Optimal Bargaining on eBay Using Deep Reinforcement Learning
    Etan Green; Barry Plunkett
  • Thompson Sampling with Unrestricted Delays
    Han Wu; Stefan Wager
  • Design and analysis of bipartite experiments under a linear exposure-response model
    Christopher Harshaw; Fredrik Sävje; David Eisenstat; Vahab Mirrokni; Jean Pouget-Abadie
  • Seeding a Simple Contagion
    Evan Sadler
  • Matchmaking Strategies for Maximizing Player Engagement in Video Games
    Mingliu Chen; Adam N. Elmachtoub; Xiao Lei
  • Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems
    Kun Jin; Xueru Zhang; Mohammad Mahdi Khalili; Parinaz Naghizadeh; Mingyan Liu
  • Dynamic Spatial Matching
    Yash Kanoria
  • Crowd Prediction Systems: Markets, Polls, and Elite Forecasters
    Pavel Atanasov; Jens Witkowski; Barbara Mellers; Philip Tetlock
  • Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multi-Channel Traffic
    Vahideh Manshadi; Scott Rodilitz; Daniela Saban; Akshaya Suresh
  • Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals
    Eric Neyman; Tim Roughgarden
  • Persuasion as Transportation
    Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy
  • Causal Gradient Boosting: Boosted Instrumental Variable Regression
    Edvard Bakhitov; Amandeep Singh
  • Improved Upper Bounds for Finding Tarski Fixed Points
    Xi Chen; Yuhao Li
  • Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset
    Modibo Camara
  • Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization
    Matteo Castiglioni; Alberto Marchesi; Nicola Gatti
  • Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District
    Maxwell Allman; Itai Ashlagi; Irene Lo; Juliette Love; Katherine Mentzer; Henry O’Connell; Lulabel Ruiz-Setz
  • A Population’s Feasible Posterior Beliefs
    Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko
  • Costly Multidimensional Screening
    Frank Yang
  • Embeddings and Distance-based Demand for Differentiated Products
    Lorenzo Magnolfi; Jonathon McClure; Alan Sorensen
  • The Multisecretary Problem with Many Types
    Omar Besbes; Yash Kanoria; Akshit Kumar
  • A Dynamic Framework of School Choice: Effects of Middle Schools on High School Choice
    Dong Woo Hahm; Minseon Park
  • Contextually Private Mechanisms
    Andreas Haupt; Zoe Hitzig
  • Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design
    Yang Cai; Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Equity in resident crowdsourcing: measuring under-reporting without ground truth data
    Zhi Liu; Nikhil Garg
  • Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints
    Ethan Che
  • Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources
    Steven Delong; Alireza Farhadi; Rad Niazadeh; Balasubramanian Sivan
  • Outcome-Driven Dynamic Refugee Assignment with Allocation Balancing
    Kirk Bansak; Elisabeth Paulson
  • Unpacking the Black Box: Regulating Algorithmic Decisions
    Laura Blattner; Scott Nelson; Jann Spiess
  • Optimal Credit Scores Under Adverse Selection
    Andre Medeiros Sztutman; Nicole Immorlica; Robert Townsend
  • Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single Controller
    Muhammed Sayin; Kaiqing Zhang; Asuman Ozdaglar
  • Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of Products
    Arash Asadpour; Rad Niazadeh; Amin Saberi; Ali Shameli
  • Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations
    Sarah Dean; Jamie Morgenstern
  • Speculation in Procurement Auctions
    Shanglyu Deng
  • Just Resource Allocation? How Algorithmic Predictions and Human Notions of Justice Interact
    Amanda Kube; Sanmay Das; Patrick J. Fowler; Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
  • Auction Throttling and Causal Inference of Online Advertising Effects
    George Gui; Harikesh Nair; Fengshi Niu
  • Estimation of Standard Auction Models
    Yeshwanth Cherapanamjeri; Constantinos Daskalakis; Andrew Ilyas; Manolis Zampetakis
  • Computationally Tractable Choice
    Modibo Camara
  • Optimal Stratetic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
    Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira; Sally Hahn; Catherine Yu; S. Matthew Weinberg
  • Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation
    Brian Zhang; Gabriele Farina; Andrea Celli; Tuomas Sandholm
  • Asymmetric Taxation, Pass-through and Market Competition: Evidence from Ride-sharing and Taxis
    Mario Leccese
  • Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalities
    Makis Arsenis; Robert Kleinberg
  • Main Program
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  • Posters
  • Preview Day
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  • Accepted Papers
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  • Main Program
  • Tutorials
  • Posters
  • Preview Day
  • Workshops
  • Mentoring Workshop
  • Accepted Papers
  • Awards

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