The main technical program of EC’22 will take place from Tuesday, July 12 to Thursday, July 14 at the University of Colorado Boulder (in the Engineering Center and nearby buildings). The talks will be primarily in-person (including all plenary talks and roughly 80% of all parallel session talks), though there will be a online live-stream of talks into the virtual venue as well.
For a high-level overview of the technical program, see here.
Locations
- Conference and Workshops: Engineering Center Lobby, 1111 Engineering Dr
- Opening Reception (Monday): South Terrace at University Memorial Center, 1669 Euclid Avenue
- Banquet (Wednesday): Stadium Club at Folsom Field, 2150 Colorado Ave
Time Zone
Note that all times are in Mountain Time (MT).
Lightning Talks and Posters
For those papers that participated in the virtual preview day, you can browse the posters and 2 minute lightning talks (aka flash videos) below in the program. You can also browse all the lightning talks together here.
| Monday, July 11th, 2022 | ||||
| 06:00 – 08:30 PM | Opening Reception (University Memorial Center South Terrace) | |||
| Tuesday, July 12th, 2022 | ||||
| 09:00 – 09:20 AM | PLENARY: Welcome, Opening Remarks, and Award Conferrals (Chair: Sven Seuken) | |||
| 9:20 – 10:20 AM | PLENARY: Best Paper Awards (Chair: Ilya Segal) | |||
| 9:20 – 9:50 AM | ACM SIGecom Best Paper Award: The Science of the Deal: Optimal Bargaining on eBay Using Deep Reinforcement Learning (Etan Green, Barry Plunkett) | |||
| 9:50 – 10:20 AM | ACM SIGecom Best Paper with a Student Lead Author and Exemplary Theory Track Award: Computationally Tractable Choice (Modibo Camara) | |||
| 10:20 – 10:50 AM | Coffee Break 30 min | |||
| 10:50 – 12:10 PM | Parallel Session 1 | |||
| Decision theory | Online Matching and Ridesharing | Blockchains | Robust Auction Design | |
| Chair: Yakov Babichenko | Chair: Rad Niazadeh | Chair: Matt Weinberg | Chair: Felix Fischer | |
| 10:50 – 11:10 AM | Monotone Additive Statistics Xiaosheng Mu, Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz |
Randomized FIFO Mechanisms Francisco Castro, Hongyao Ma, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Chiwei Yan [poster] [flash vid] |
Blockchain Stretching & Squeezing: Manipulating Time For Your Best Interest Aviv Yaish, Saar Tochner, Aviv Zohar |
Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions Nir Bachrach, Inbal Talgam-Cohen |
| 11:10 – 11:30 AM | Closure operators: Complexity and applications to classification and decision-making Hamed Hamze Bajgiran, Federico Echenique |
On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching Sueleyman Kerimov, Itai Ashlagi, Itai Gurvich |
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, Catherine Yu, S. Matthew Weinberg [poster] [flash vid] |
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes [poster] [flash vid] |
| 11:30 – 11:50 AM | Robust Data-Driven Decisions Under Model Uncertainty Xiaoyu Cheng |
The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets Mohammad Akbarpour, Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Shengwu Li, Amin Saberi [poster] |
Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers Guillermo Angeris, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra, Stephen Boyd |
Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints Ethan Che |
| 11:50 – 12:10 PM | Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus Accuracy Annie Liang, Jay Lu, Xiaosheng Mu |
Dynamic Spatial Matching Yash Kanoria |
Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing Nikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach |
Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism Wanchang Zhang [poster] [flash vid] |
| 12:10 – 1:40 PM | PLENARY: Town Hall Meeting with brown bag lunch | |||
| 1:40 – 3:00 PM | Parallel Session 2 | |||
| Equilibrium in Games | Prophet Inequalities | Social Networks | School Choice and Object Reallocation | |
| Chair: Annie Liang | Chair: Paul Duetting | Chair: Kevin He | Chair: Irene Lo | |
| 1:40 – 2:00 PM | The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game Akash Gaonkar, Divya Raghunathan, S. Matthew Weinberg |
Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem Nick Arnosti, Will Ma |
Seeding a Simple Contagion Evan Sadler |
Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design? Theory and Evidence Natalie Cox, Ricardo Fonseca, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson [poster] |
| 2:00 – 2:20 PM | An algorithmic solution to the Blotto game using multi-marginal couplings Vianney Perchet, Philippe Rigollet, Thibaut Le Gouic [poster] [flash vid] |
The Stationary Prophet Inequality Problem Kristen Kessel, Ali Shameli, Amin Saberi, David Wajc [poster] [flash vid] |
On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Integration Rediet Abebe, Nicole Immorlica, Jon Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier, Ali Shirali [poster] [flash vid] |
Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Irene Lo, Juliette Love, Katherine Mentzer, Henry O’Connell, Lulabel Ruiz-Setz |
| 2:20 – 2:40 PM | Quantal Correlated Equilibrium in Normal Form Games Jakub Cerny, Bo An, Allan N. Zhang [poster] [flash vid] |
Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalities Makis Arsenis, Robert Kleinberg [poster] [flash vid] |
Peer Effects from Friends and Strangers: Evidence from Random Matchmaking in an Online Game Daniel Goetz, Wei Lu |
A Dynamic Framework of School Choice: Effects of Middle Schools on High School Choice Dong Woo Hahm, Minseon Park |
| 2:40 – 3:00 PM | Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and Applications Evan Friedman, Felix Mauersberger |
Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality Saeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Rad Niazadeh |
The production and consumption of social media Apostolos Filippas, John Horton, Elliot Lipnowski |
Pair-efficient Reallocation of Indivisible Objects Ozgun Ekici |
| 3:00 – 3:30 PM | Coffee Break 30 min | |||
| 3:30 – 4:30 PM | PLENARY: Highlights Beyond EC (Chair: Martin Bichler) | |||
| 3:30 – 3:50 PM | Mean field equilibrium: uniqueness, existence, and comparative statics (Bar Light and Gabriel Y. Weintraub) | |||
| 3:50 – 4:10 PM | Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design (Hao Chung and Elaine Shi) | |||
| 4:10 – 4:30 PM | The welfare effects of social media (Hunt Allcott, Luca Braghieri, Sarah Eichmeyer, and Matthew Gentzkow) | |||
| 4:30 – 4:40 PM | Break 10 min | |||
| 4:40 – 6:00 PM | Parallel Session 3 | |||
| Empirics of Online Platforms | Pricing | Social Learning | Mechanism Design I | |
| Chair: Krishnamurthy Iyer | Chair: Will Ma | Chair: Fedor Sandomirskiy | Chair: Manolis Pountourakis | |
| 4:40 – 5:00 PM | Bidders’ Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising Auctions Shumpei Goke, Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Ralph Mastromonaco, Sam Seljan |
Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without Convexity Paul Milgrom, Mitchell Watt [poster] [flash vid] |
Granular DeGroot Dynamics — a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz |
Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design Afshin Nikzad |
| 5:00 – 5:20 PM | Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price Rules Miguel Alcobendas, Robert Zeithammer |
Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks J. Massey Cashore, Peter Frazier, Eva Tardos [poster] |
Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks Wanying Huang, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz |
Mechanisms without Transfers for Fully Biased Agents Deniz Kattwinkel, Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser, Alexander Winter |
| 5:20 – 5:40 PM | Auction Throttling and Causal Inference of Online Advertising Effects George Gui, Harikesh Nair, Fengshi Niu |
The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing Johannes Brustle, Jose Correa, Paul Duetting, Victor Verdugo |
A Population’s Feasible Posterior Beliefs Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko [poster] [flash vid] |
A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment Niccolo Lomys, Takuro Yamashita |
| 5:40 – 6:00 PM | Chasing Stars: Firms’ Strategic Responses to Online Consumer Ratings Megan Hunter |
Improved Online Contention Resolution for Matchings and Applications to the Gig Economy Tristan Pollner, Mohammad Roghani, Amin Saberi, David Wajc [poster] [flash vid] |
Bias-Variance Games Yiding Feng, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov [poster] [flash vid] |
Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms Estelle Varloot, Rida Laraki |
| Wednesday July 13th, 2022 | ||||
| 08:00 – 09:00 AM | Women’s Breakfast sponsored by Meta (Engineering Lobby) | |||
| 09:00 – 10:20 AM | Parallel Session 4 | |||
| Online Platforms and Fairness | Fair Division and Prediction Markets | Bayesian Persuasion | Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders | |
| Chair: Tom Blake | Chair: Jugal Garg | Chair: Haifeng Xu | Chair: Martin Bichler | |
| 09:00 – 09:20 AM | The Effect of Short-Term Rentals on Residential Investment Ron Bekkerman, Maxime Cohen, Edward Kung, John Maiden, Davide Proserpio |
On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms Biaoshuai Tao [poster] [flash vid] |
Persuasion as Transportation Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy |
Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained Buyers Eleni Batziou, Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl [poster] [flash vid] |
| 09:20 – 09:40 AM | Asymmetric Taxation, Pass-through and Market Competition: Evidence from Ride-sharing and Taxis Mario Leccese [poster] [flash vid] |
Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige [poster] [flash vid] |
Credible Persuasion Xiao Lin, Ce Liu |
Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Song Zuo |
| 09:40 – 10:00 AM | Statistical Discrimination in Stable Matchings Remi Castera, Patrick Loiseau, Bary S.R. Pradelski |
Fair Allocations for Smoothed Utilities Yushi Bai, Uriel Feige, Paul Goelz, Ariel Procaccia |
Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards Chang Liu |
Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees Santiago Balseiro, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar [poster] [flash vid] |
| 10:00 – 10:20 AM | Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic Candidates Vitalii Emelianov, Nicolas Gast, Patrick Loiseau [poster] [flash vid] |
Price Interpretability of Prediction Markets: A Convergence Analysis Dian Yu, Jianjun Gao, Weiping Wu, Zizhuo Wang |
Markov Persuasion Processes and Reinforcement Learning Jibang Wu, Zixuan Zhang, Zhe Feng, Zhaoran Wang, Zhuoran Yang, Michael Jordan, Haifeng Xu [poster] [flash vid] |
Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms Shao-Heng Ko, Kamesh Munagala |
| 10:20 – 10:50 AM | Coffee Break 30 min | |||
| 10:50 – 11:50 AM | PLENARY: Exemplary Track Awards (Chair: Ilya Segal) | |||
| 10:50 – 11:10 AM | Exemplary Applied Modeling Track Paper: The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization (Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Manish Raghavan) [poster] [flash vid] | |||
| 11:10 – 11:30 AM | Exemplary AI Track Paper: Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design (Martino Banchio and Andrzej Skrzypacz) [poster] | |||
| 11:30 – 11:50 AM | Exemplary Empirics Track Paper: Algorithmic Pricing Facilitates Tacit Collusion: Evidence from E-Commerce (Leon Musolff) | |||
| 11:50 – 1:40 PM | Lunch 110 min | |||
| 1:40 – 3:00 PM | Parallel Session 5 | |||
| Mechanism Design with Learning | Voting | Estimation Methods | Mechanism Design II | |
| Chair: Rad Niazadeh | Chair: Paul Gölz | Chair: Jamie Morgenstern | Chair: Sam Taggart | |
| 1:40 – 2:00 PM | Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan [poster] [flash vid] |
Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: the Design of Multi-member Districts Nikhil Garg, Wes Gurnee, David Rothschild, David Shmoys [poster] [flash vid] |
Estimation of Standard Auction Models Yeshwanth Cherapanamjeri, Constantinos Daskalakis, Andrew Ilyas, Manolis Zampetakis |
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal? Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas, Mingfei Zhao [poster] [flash vid] |
| 2:00 – 2:20 PM | Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan [poster] [flash vid] |
In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins Paul Goelz, Dominik Peters, Ariel Procaccia |
Causal Gradient Boosting: Boosted Instrumental Variable Regression Edvard Bakhitov, Amandeep Singh |
Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information Yingkai Li [poster] [flash vid] |
| 2:20 – 2:40 PM | Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset Modibo Camara |
Optimized Fairness and Distortion in Voting Soroush Ebadian, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters, Nisarg Shah [poster] [flash vid] |
Design and analysis of bipartite experiments under a linear exposure-response model Christopher Harshaw, Fredrik Savje, David Eisenstat, Vahab Mirrokni, Jean Pouget-Abadie |
Delegated Pandora’s Box Curtis Bechtel, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel [poster] [flash vid] |
| 2:40 – 3:00 PM | Unpacking the Black Box: Regulating Algorithmic Decisions Laura Blattner, Scott Nelson, Jann Spiess |
A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions Antonin Mace, Rafael Treibich |
Embeddings and Distance-based Demand for Differentiated Products Lorenzo Magnolfi, Jonathon McClure, Alan Sorensen |
Contracting and Vertical Control by a Dominant Platform Zi Yang Kang, Ellen Muir [poster] [flash vid] |
| 3:00 – 3:30 PM | Coffee Break 30 min | |||
| 3:30 – 4:30 PM | PLENARY: Keynote by Tim Roughgarden (Columbia University and a16z): Economics and Computation in Blockchains/Web3 (Chair: Ilya Segal; Introduction by: Scott Kominers) | |||
| 4:30 – 4:40 PM | Break 10 min | |||
| 4:40 – 6:00 PM | Parallel Session 6 | |||
| Contract Design | Strategic Data Sharing and Attacks | Recommendations | Auctions and Bargaining | |
| Chair: Martin Hoefer | Chair: Kate Donahue | Chair: Christian Kroer | Chair: Jakob Weissteiner | |
| 4:40 – 5:00 PM | Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules Maneesha Papireddygari, Bo Waggoner |
Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks Yotam Gafni, Moshe Tennenholtz [poster] [flash vid] |
Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous Prices Peng Shi [poster] [flash vid] |
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin [poster] [flash vid] |
| 5:00 – 5:20 PM | Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti [poster] [flash vid] |
Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems Kun Jin, Xueru Zhang, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu [poster] [flash vid] |
Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations Sarah Dean, Jamie Morgenstern [poster] [flash vid] |
Speculation in Procurement Auctions Shanglyu Deng |
| 5:20 – 5:40 PM | Public Signals in Network Congestion Games Martin Hoefer, Tim Koglin, Max Klimm, Svenja Marie Griesbach [poster] [flash vid] |
Screening p-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait Federico Echenique, Kevin He |
Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of Products Arash Asadpour, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli |
Double Auctions and Transaction Costs Simon Jantschgi, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S.R. Pradelski, Marek Pycia |
| 5:40 – 6:00 PM | Optimal Credit Scores Under Adverse Selection Andre Medeiros Sztutman, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Townsend [poster] [flash vid] |
Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li, Xiang Yan [poster] [flash vid] |
Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret Yiding Feng, Wei Tang, Haifeng Xu [poster] [flash vid] |
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information S. Nageeb Ali, Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner |
| 6:00 – 6:30 PM | Break/Transfer 30 min | |||
| 6:30 – 9:00 PM | Banquet (Folsom Field Stadium Club) | |||
| Thursday, July 14th, 2022 | ||||
| 08:00 – 09:00 AM | Mentoring Breakfast sponsored by Microsoft (Engineering Lobby) | |||
| 09:00 – 10:20 AM | Parallel Session 7 | |||
| Information Design | Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design | Learning to Play | Stable Matching | |
| Chair: Martin Hoefer | Chair: Rad Niazadeh | Chair: Juba Ziani | Chair: Mohammad Mahdian | |
| 09:00 – 09:20 AM | The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang |
A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Non-Additive Values Soheil Ghili |
Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm [poster] [flash vid] |
How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India Orhan Aygun, Bertan Turhan [poster] |
| 09:20 – 09:40 AM | Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibilities and Limits in Singleton Congestion Chenghan Zhou, Thanh H. Nguyen, Haifeng Xu [poster] [flash vid] |
Costly Multidimensional Screening Frank Yang |
Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents Nika Haghtalab, Thodoris Lykouris, Sloan Nietert, Alexander Wei [poster] [flash vid] |
The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence Peter Biro, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran Shorrer, Sandor Sovago [poster] [flash vid] |
| 09:40 – 10:00 AM | Information Design in Concave Games Alex Smolin, Takuro Yamashita |
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou |
Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single Controller Muhammed Sayin, Kaiqing Zhang, Asuman Ozdaglar [poster] |
A Continuum Model of Stable Matching With Finite Capacities Nick Arnosti |
| 10:00 – 10:20 AM | Herd Design Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky [poster] [flash vid] |
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis |
Thompson Sampling with Unrestricted Delays Han Wu, Stefan Wager |
On Two-sided Matching in Infinite Markets Yunseo Choi |
| 10:20 – 10:45 AM | Coffee Break 25 min | |||
| 10:45 – 11:45 AM | PLENARY: Keynote by Michael Jordan (UC Berkeley): On Learning-Aware, Dynamics-Informed Mechanism Design (Chair: Kevin Leyton-Brown) | |||
| 11:45 – 1:25 PM | Lunch 100 min | |||
| 1:25 – 3:05 PM | Parallel Session 8 | |||
| Online Matching | Information Elicitation and Crowdsourcing | Market Design Applications | Social Ranking | |
| Chair: Mohammad Mahdian | Chair: Yakov Babichenko | Chair: Adam Elmachtoub | Chair: Thayer Morrill | |
| 1:25 – 1:45 PM | Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources Steven Delong, Alireza Farhadi, Rad Niazadeh, Balasubramanian Sivan |
Optimization of Scoring Rules Yingkai Li, Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yifan Wu [poster] [flash vid] |
Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public Cloud Patrick Hummel, Michael Schwarz [poster] [flash vid] |
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes Emily Dale, Jessica Fielding, Hari Ramakrishnan, Sacheth Sathyanarayanan, S. Matthew Weinberg [poster] [flash vid] |
| 1:45 – 2:05 PM | Near-Optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi [poster] [flash vid] |
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden |
Matchmaking Strategies for Maximizing Player Engagement in Video Games Mingliu Chen, Adam N. Elmachtoub, Xiao Lei |
Improving Ranking Quality and Fairness in Swiss-System Chess Tournaments Agnes Cseh, Pascal Fuehrlich, Pascal Lenzner |
| 2:05 – 2:25 PM | Periodic Reranking for Online Matching of Reusable Resources Rajan Udwani |
Crowd Prediction Systems: Markets, Polls, and Elite Forecasters Pavel Atanasov, Jens Witkowski, Barbara Mellers, Philip Tetlock |
A System-Level Analysis of Conference Peer Review Yichi Zhang, Fang-Yi Yu, Grant Schoenebeck, David Kempe [poster] [flash vid] |
Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process Thayer Morrill, Peter Troyan |
| 2:25 – 2:45 PM | Max-Weight Online Stochastic Matching: Improved Approximations Against the Online Benchmark Mark Braverman, Mahsa Derakhshan, Antonio Molina Lovett |
Crowdsourcing and optimal market design Bobak Pakzad-Hurson [poster] |
When is Assortment Optimization Optimal? Will Ma |
Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, David Hannon, Max Klimm [poster] [flash vid] |
| 2:45 – 3:05 PM | Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multi-Channel Traffic Vahideh Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz, Daniela Saban, Akshaya Suresh |
Equity in resident crowdsourcing: measuring under-reporting without ground truth data Zhi Liu, Nikhil Garg [poster] [flash vid] |
||
| 2:45 – 3:30 PM | Coffee Break 25-45 min | |||
| 3:30 – 4:30 PM | PLENARY: SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award + Test-of-time Award (Chair: Nicole Immorlica) | |||
| 3:30 – 4:00 PM | ACM SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award: Automated Algorithm and Mechanism Configuration (Ellen Vitercik) | |||
| 4:00 – 4:30 PM | ACM SIGecom Test of Time Award: The Complexity of Nash Equilibrium (Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng) | |||
| 4:30 – 4:40 PM | Break 10 min | |||
| 4:40 – 6:00 PM | Parallel Session 9 | |||
| Equilibrium Computation | Privacy by Design | Secretary Problems and Welfare Bounds | Allocation for Social Good | |
| Chair: Christian Kroer | Chair: Juba Ziani | Chair: Paul Duetting | Chair: Paul Gölz | |
| 4:40 – 5:00 PM | Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Peter McGlaughlin, Ruta Mehta |
Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local Mechanisms Alireza Fallah, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asuman Ozdaglar [poster] [flash vid] |
The Multisecretary Problem with Many Types Omar Besbes, Yash Kanoria, Akshit Kumar [poster] [flash vid] |
Lotteries for Shared Experiences Carlos Bonet, Nick Arnosti |
| 5:00 – 5:20 PM | Improved Upper Bounds for Finding Tarski Fixed Points Xi Chen, Yuhao Li [poster] [flash vid] |
Information Design for Differential Privacy Ian M. Schmutte, Nathan Yoder |
General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang [flash vid] |
An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization Mohammad Akbarpour, Eric Budish, Piotr Dworczak, Scott Kominers |
| 5:20 – 5:40 PM | Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation Brian Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm [poster] [flash vid] |
Contextually Private Mechanisms Andreas Haupt, Zoe Hitzig [poster] [flash vid] |
Robust Bounds for Welfare Analysis Zi Yang Kang, Shoshana Vasserman [poster] [flash vid] |
Outcome-Driven Dynamic Refugee Assignment with Allocation Balancing Kirk Bansak, Elisabeth Paulson |
| 5:40 – 6:00 PM | Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer [poster] [flash vid] |
Private Private Information Kevin He, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz |
Just Resource Allocation? How Algorithmic Predictions and Human Notions of Justice Interact Amanda Kube, Sanmay Das, Patrick J. Fowler, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik [poster] |
|
| Friday, July 15th, 2022 | ||||
| 09:00AM – 6:00 PM | Workshops | |||