Preview Day

EC’22 will feature a fully virtual Preview Day on Wednesday, July 6, 2022, during which authors of accepted papers will have the opportunity to advertise their upcoming talk, and attendees will have the opportunity to browse the EC program and curate their experience.

Preview Day will be hosted in the EC virtual venue. Participants must register for EC (full conference or virtual-only) in advance to access the venue.

Authors who choose to participate in the preview day will be assigned a slot in a poster session, and are expected to be present at their poster during their slot. There will also be a virtual TV displaying pre-recorded 2-minute lightning talks which can further assist in finding interesting papers.

The schedule of the sessions (all in Eastern time) is as follows:

Session 1: 10:15-12:30pm ET

  • [5] Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic Agents (Vitalii Emelianov, Nicolas Gast, Patrick Loiseau)
  • [172] Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives (Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige)
  • [157] Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes (Emily Dale, Jessica Fielding, Hari Ramakrishnan, Sacheth Sathyanarayanan, S. Matthew Weinberg)
  • [340] Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks (Yotam Gafni, Moshe Tennenholtz)
  • [471] The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence (Péter Biro, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran Shorrer, Sandor Sovago)
  • [488] Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibilities and Limits in Singleton Congestion (Chenghan Zhou, Thanh H. Nguyen, Haifeng Xu)
  • [576] Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks (Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li, Xiang Yan)
  • [588] How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India (Orhan Aygun, Bertan Turhan)
  • [773] Public Signals in Network Congestion Games (Martin Hoefer, Tim Koglin, Max Klimm, Svenja Marie Griesbach)
  • [1601] Asymmetric Taxation, Pass-through and Market Competition: Evidence from Ride-sharing and Taxis (Mario Leccese)
  • [186] Herd Design (Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky)
  • [220] Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information (Yingkai Li)
  • [235] Delegated Pandora’s Box (Curtis Bechtel, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel)
  • [244] On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms (Biaoshuai Tao)
  • [286] Optimized Fairness and Distortion in Voting (Soroush Ebadian, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters, Nisarg Shah)
  • [554] Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained Buyers (Eleni Batziou, Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl)
  • [595] Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion (Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, David Hannon, Max Klimm)
  • [733] Quantal Correlated Equilibrium in Normal Form Games (Jakub Cerny, Bo An, Allan N. Zhang)
  • [1291] Optimal Credit Scores Under Adverse Selection (Andre Medeiros Sztutman, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Townsend)
  • [22] On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Integration (Rediet Abebe, Nicole Immorlica, Jon Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier, Ali Shirali)
  • [59] Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism (Wanchang Zhang)
  • [108] Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design (Martino Banchio, Andrzej Skrzypacz)
  • [388] On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design (Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Santiago R. Balseiro)
  • [402] The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets (Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Amin Saberi, Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li)
  • [477] Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria (Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm)
  • [512] The Stationary Prophet Inequality Problem (Kristen Kessel, Ali Shameli, Amin Saberi, David Wajc)
  • [553] An algorithmic solution to the Blotto game using multi-marginal couplings (Vianney Perchet, Philippe Rigollet, Thibaut Le Gouic)
  • [994] Improved Upper Bounds for Finding Tarski Fixed Points (Xi Chen, Yuhao Li)

Session 2: 2:45-4:15pm ET

  • [18] Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal? (Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas, Mingfei Zhao)
  • [216] Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions (Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan)
  • [352] Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret (Yiding Feng, Wei Tang, Haifeng Xu)
  • [364] A System-Level Analysis of Conference Peer Review (Yichi Zhang, Fang-Yi Yu, Grant Schoenebeck, David Kempe)
  • [410] Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design? Theory and Evidence (Natalie Cox, Ricardo Fonseca, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson)
  • [1149] The Multisecretary Problem with Many Types (Omar Besbes, Yash Kanoria, Akshit Kumar)
  • [1175] Contextually Private Mechanisms (Andreas Haupt, Zoe Hitzig)
  • [1310] Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single Controller (Muhammed Sayin, Kaiqing Zhang, Asuman Ozdaglar)
  • [1591] Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation (Brian Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm)
  • [83] Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees (Rachitesh Kumar, Christian Kroer, Santiago Balseiro)
  • [84] Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints (Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer)
  • [350] The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization (Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, Manish Raghavan)
  • [382] Contracting and Vertical Control by a Dominant Platform (Zi Yang Kang, Ellen Muir)
  • [428] Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents (Nika Haghtalab, Thodoris Lykouris, Sloan Nietert, Alexander Wei)
  • [456] Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location (Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan)
  • [687] Crowdsourcing and optimal market design (Bobak Pakzad-Hurson)
  • [699] Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without Convexity (Paul Milgrom, Mitchell Watt)
  • [1349] Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations (Sarah Dean, Jamie Morgenstern)

Session 3: 4:15-5:45pm ET

  • [134] Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local Mechanisms (Alireza Fallah, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asuman Ozdaglar)
  • [252] Optimization of Scoring Rules (Yingkai Li, Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yifan Wu)
  • [253] Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks (J. Massey Cashore, Peter Frazier, Eva Tardos)
  • [275] Bias-Variance Games (Yiding Feng, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Jason D. Hartline)
  • [281] Near-Optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources (Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi)
  • [422] Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: the Design of Multi-member Districts (Nikhil Garg, Wes Gurnee, David Rothschild, David Shmoys)
  • [1179] Equity in resident crowdsourcing: measuring under-reporting without ground truth data (Zhi Liu, Nikhil Garg)
  • [1586] Optimal Stratetic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake (Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu)
  • [1653] Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalities (Makis Arsenis, Robert Kleinberg)
  • [16] Markov Persuasion Processes and Reinforcement Learning (Jibang Wu, Zixuan Zhang, Zhe Feng, Zhaoran Wang, Zhuoran Yang, Michael Jordan, Haifeng Xu)
  • [47] Randomized FIFO Mechanisms (Francisco Castro, Hongyao Ma, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Chiwei Yan)
  • [51] Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions (Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin)
  • [70] Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous Prices (Peng Shi)
  • [354] Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public Cloud (Patrick Hummel, Michael Schwarz)
  • [478] Robust Bounds for Welfare Analysis (Zi Yang Kang, Shoshana Vasserman)
  • [879] Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems (Kun Jin, Xueru Zhang, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu)
  • [1378] Just Resource Allocation? How Algorithmic Predictions and Human Notions of Justice Interact (Amanda Kube, Sanmay Das, Patrick J. Fowler, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik)
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